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resources to pay an entry cost. Due to the presence of an extemality in the developed sector, as the 
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However, when the economy is in the middle stages of development, multiple equilibrium arise since 
the extemality affects the performance of the credit market. The multiplicity of equilibria disappear 
when the credit market is perfect or it does not exist. Moreover, we fmd that in economies with 
imperfect credit markets, per cap ita output volatility tends to be higher than in economies with perfect 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to address the high variability of per capita GDP 
displayed by middle-income countries, which contrasts with the low variabil-
ity of capita GDP shown by both, low and high income economies. In order 
to illustrate this fact, Figure 1 plots the variability for different groups of 
countries1. 
[Figure 1 here] 
The paper also explores the relationship between the degree of develop-
ment in the financial sector and per capita GDP variability. We found that, 
in economies where either a perfect credit market exists or the credit market 
is non-existent, the equilibrium is unique. However, when the credit market 
exists but is imperfect, there could be more than one equilibrium. In that 
case, the multiplicity of equilibria arises in middle stages of development. 
In the presence of multiplicity of equilibria, we assume the existence of a 
sunspot process that coordinates the actions of the agents. In that respect, 
this paper is related to Cooper and Ejarque (1995), Sorger (1994), and Spear 
(1991). The paper by Cooper and Ejarque (1995) presents a model in which 
the indeterminacy of equilibrium is resolved by a sunspot process. There, the 
multiplicity of equilibria arises from the existence of non-convexities in. the 
intermediation process. In Sorger (1994), a one-sector neoclassical growth 
model with borrowing constraints and heterogeneous agents is used to show 
that there can exist sunspot equilibria. Spear (1991) analyzes a dynamic 
model of pure capital accumulation to show the existence of sunspot equilib-
ria in a way that avoids converting the model to an overlapping generations 
equivalent. 
lThe data used to draw Figure 1 come from the Summers and Reston Penn \Vorld 
Table 5.5 (1960-1990). OPEe members, countries with less than one million citizens and 
countries without a complete data set were dropped from the data. We first regressed per 
capita GDP against time for each country, calculating the GDP trend afterwards. The 
statistic we used consists of the suro of each country's squared per capita GDP deviations 
from its trend, divided by the average per capita GDP. These statistics yield variability 
indices for each one of the countries in our data seto Finally, countries are classified by 
income levels and an average variability index for each group of countries is obtained. 
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In our model economy, there are two central elements: extemalities and 
market imperfections. Both are necessary conditions for the existence of 
multiple equilibria. The way in which the sunspot mechanism affects the 
equilibrium will depend on both the degree of imperfection and the size of 
the economy. 
In an economy with credit imperfections, the income distribution plays a 
very important role in determining the equilibrium. In that sense, this paper 
follows the line of work of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerje and Newman 
(1994), where income distribution is an important instrument to explain the 
economy's behavior in the development process. In our model, the income 
distribution and the externality effect determine the number of equilibria, 
and the stage at which the multiplicity of equilibria arises and when it van-
ishes. 
In order to model this economy, we use an overlapping generations model. 
In each period, a continuum of agents of measure one is born and lives for 
two periods. In the first period, the agents are heterogeneous in their ability 
to work. In the second period, they can become entrepreneurs and must 
decide whether to use an advanced technology (for which they have to pay 
an entry cost) or a subsistence technology. They can borrow resources to 
pay the entry costo In addition, there exists an externality in the advanced 
technology: the larger the fraction of people using the advanced technology, 
the more productive this technology becomes. 
In our model, the financial market is incomplete. The reason is twofold. 
First, lenders can not force borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts 
are secured. Second, the returns from investment are only partially colla ter-
alizable. This implies that credit constraints arise endogenously. Given this 
credit market imperfection, the externality in the productive sector will be 
reflected in the financial sector: the larger the fraction of people using the 
advanced technology, the larger the fraction of people that will have access 
to the credit market. The reason for this is that the borrowing constraint 
is relaxed as the returns in the advanced technology increase. This is the 
so urce of multiple equilibrium in the model which arises in the middle stage 
of the development process. On the contrary, in early and mature stages of 
development, the multiplicity does not existo 
3 
/ 
It is worthwhile to notice that, if the credit market does not exist, there 
is no interaction between the externality in the productive sector and the 
borrowing constraint. Only the fraction of people with wealth greater than 
the cost of entry will become entrepreneurs. This is also true when the credit 
market is perfecto In the latter case, there are no borrowing constraints and 
all the resources are used to finance the payment of the entry cost for those 
who want to use the advanced technology. Moreover, the interest rate will 
be such that the agents are indifferent between using the advanced or the 
subsistence technology. 
The paper shows that the introduction of a new "technology", a financial 
technology in our case, could affect positively the growth rate in the economy 
and, at the same time, be a source of higher variability if the markets are not 
complete. The Mexican crisis in a globalized market environment illustrates 
this point. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the environment is pre-
sented. In Section 3, the problem of occupational choice is discussed. In 
Section 4, we analyze the economy's labor and credit markets. Section 5 is 
devoted to the definition of equilibrium. Section 6 explains the relationship 
between the level and variability of GDP per capita in an economy with im-
perfect credit markets. In Section 7, the behavior of wages, interest rates and 
entrepreneurial choice during the development process are analyzed. Section 
8 discusses the cases of perfect credit market and non credit market. Finally, 
the conclusions are presented in Section 9. 
2 The Environment 
The model is a two-period overlapping generations mode!. At each date t, 
a continuum of agents of measure one is born. Each agent is endowed with 
one unit of labor at each periodo In the first period, the individuals can only 
be workers. They have sorne ability a with support on the interval [a,;3], a 
continuous probability distribution function h (a), and a continuous cumu-
lative distribution function H (a). In the second period, the agents can be 
managers (with the same ability) or they can remain as workers, but with 
the lowest level of ability, a. At t = 0, the initial 'old' is endowed with 
avo, where a is the same random variable as before, and Vo is a non-negative 
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number. 
The agents born at time t receive utility only from consumption at t + l. 
This is an innocuous2 assumption that simplifies the algebra. Each agent 
can choose between managing an advanced or a subsistence technology. If 
the agent chooses to manage the subsistence technology, she will have access 
to the following production function: 
g(l) (1) 
with gl > O and gu < O. \iVhere l stands for labor input, gl is the first deriva-
tive with respect to l, and gu is the second derivative with respect to l. 
If the agent wants to manage the advanced technology, she must pay an 
entry cost cf> at the end of the initial periodo That is, the agent must cornmit 
herself to this technology. In the second period, she will have access to a 
production function of the form: 
f(l,A) (2) 
with fl > O, fu < O, 1>.. > O, 1>.>. < O and fi>. > O; where A stands for the frac-
tion of people who choose to be a manager in the advanced technology. There 
are two points wort-h noticing. First of aH, the way in which the production 
function is specified implies the existence of an externality. The second point 
is that, the production function does not depend on capital in the advanced 
or the subsistence sectors. The results would be exactly the same if capital 
were included. \Vhat it is reaHy important is that the production functions 
have decreasing returns to scale in labor3 since the managerial ability is also 
a productive factor that needs to be considered. 
Two assumptions about the parameters of the model must be done: 
Assumption 1.- Even if nobody is using the advanced technology, the 
net return of this technology is higher than the return of the subsistence 
technology. That is: 
f (l, O) - cf> > 9 (l) , Vl 
2Innocuous for our multiple equlibrium resulto 
3 And capital if it were included. 
5 
(3) 
Assumption 2.- The entry cost belongs to the interval (a,{3). More 
specifically: 
(4) 
where a and {3 are both positive numbers. 
There also exists a storage technology. By using this technology, the 
agents can transform date t goods into date t + 1 goods at arate of one-to-
one. 
The individual can borrow resources to pay the entry cost, with the obli-
gation to repay the loan next periodo However, since financial markets are 
imperfect, there exists an enforcement problem. The lenders can not force the 
borrowers to repay the debt, but they can seize a fraction 8 of the borrower's 
managerial income. Also, it is assumed that there exists perfect information 
about the initial wealth of each agent. 
In this model, the decisions are sequential. Agents born in period t work 
for managers who were born in period t - 1. They are paid according to their 
ability. At the end of period t, they make their financial decisions (lend, bor-
row or invest in the storage technology) and decide whether or not to pay 
the entry costo At period t + 1, those who paid the entry cost can manage 
the advance technology, otherwise they manage the subsistence technology 
or remain as workers. Managers will hire labor at a competitive wage and, 
at the end of the period, will execute the financial obligations and consume 
whatever is left. 
Notice that the decision to pay the entry cost must be taken at the end of 
the period, when the number of entrepreneurs is unknown. In order to solve 
this problem, we assume the existence of a sunspot process that coordinates 
the actions of the agents4 • That is, the sunspot is generated from a correlated 
device from which the agents receive signals. The decisions taken by the 
agents are functions of the received signal (observed sunspot). In order to 
incorporate the sunspot to the model, let us define Wt as the state of the 
4We follow the same idea as Cooper and Ejarque (1995). Theirs, as ours, is inspired 
in the idea of Correlated Equilibrium (see Auman, 1987) as a Nash Equilibrium in which 
agent's actions are based on extrinsic noise. 
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economy at time t; and ¿;t as the set of possible sunspots at time t, where 
in fact this set is a function of the state of the economy, i.e. ¿;t = ~ (Wt). 
AIso, let at be an element of ~t. For completeness, let us define a probability 
distribution of ¿;t denoted \lit, Le. \lit E \lI (¿;t) where \lI (A) denotes the set 
of probability distributions over the set A. 
3 Optimal Behavior 
In this section, we are going to analyze the optimal decisions of an agent 
type a born at period t. This is easy to do working the model backwards. 
Let us start with the assumption that the agent has paid the entry cost at 
time t. This means she is a manager in the advanced sector and she will try 
to maximize her managerial income given the wage rate, Vt+l. That is: 
(5) 
where la (Vt+l' AHl) is the solution to this problem. Notice that, at this stage, 
the fraction of total managers in the advanced sector is known. 
If the agent did not pay the entry cost, she must decide between being 
a worker or a manager in the subsistence sector. The income from being a 
manager at the subsistence sector is: 
(6) 
where ls (Vt+1) is the solution to (6). Notice that in equilibrium v will be a 
function of A; so ls and lls will also be functions of A. 
The income from being a worker is just: 
llw (Vt+1) = aVt+1 (7) 
From equations (6) and (7), we can find a threshold level for the wage, 
vD, such that, for any v < vD, the agents who did not pay the entry cost will 
prefer to be managers at the subsistence sector and, whenever v > vD, those 
agents will prefer to be workers5 . The existence and uniqueness of vD follow 
5It is easy to see that when ex ~ 0, vO ~ oo. 'Ve will assume that this is the case. 
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from the continuity and concavity of 9 (l). 
At the end of period t, an agent type a has wealth aVt. At that time, she 
must choose whether or not to pay the entry cost and the financial contracts. 
Notice that, at this point, >'t+l is unknown, but the agents observe a signal 
(sunspot) (J, and take a decision. 
Given (J, the agents will pay the entry cost only if two conditions are 
satisfied: 
ITa (>' ((J)) - rt,t+1<p ~ max {ITs (>' ((J)) , ITw (>' ((J))) (8) 
where rt,t+l is the interest rate for loans made at period t and repaid at period 
t + 1. Interpreting equation (8) is trivial. It just tells us that the individual 
will pay the entry cost if the net return of doing this is higher than its op-
portunity costo Equation (9) tells us about the borrowing constraint. If the 
amount of resources that the agent must repay at period t + 1 is greater than 
the fraction () of her final income, the agent will not receive credit because 
she will have an incentive to default. 
Definition 1 . For an agent type a, and sunspot (J, let us define the payment 
function <p(a,>.((J) ,VilVt+l,rt,t+1) such that: 
<p (a, >. ((J) ,Vt, Vt+l, rt,t+l) = 1 if (8) and (9) are satisfied (10) 
= O otherwise 
Let us now characterize the borrowing constraint of this economy. Using 
equation (9), we can have and idea of the extent of credit rationing in this 
economy. Solving equation (9) with equality, we get: 
<p - OIIa{>.{a)) 
ac (>'((J),Vil rtt+l) = rt,t+l 
, Vt (11) 
This means that, an agent with initial ability a, will receive credit if a ~ 
ac (>' ((J), Vil rt,t+l) and she will be denied credit if a < ac (>' ((J) ,Vil rt,t+1)' 
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Now, we can see how the externality in the productive sector is refiected 
in the financial sector. The equation ac (A (O") ,Vt, rt,t+¡) is decreasing in A, 
that is, the larger the fraction of population using the advanced technol-
ogy, the more people will have access to the credit market. AIso, note that 
ac (A (O") ,Vt, rt,t+l) depends negatively on Vt. A higher wage implies a lower 
criticallevel, so the fraction of people who are credit constrained is smaller. 
In Proposition 1, ac (A (O") ,Vt, rt,t+l) will be completely characterized. 
Proposition 1 . Let ac : [0,1] x ~ x [1,00) -+ ~ be a functian defined by 
(11). Then: 
(i) ac (.) is cantinuaus in all its arguments, 
(ii) ac (.) is increasing in r, and 
(iii) ac (.) is decreasing in ). and v. 
Proof. [See Appendix} 
4 Credit, Investment and Labor 
Before defining the equilibrium for this economy, we will analyze in sorne 
detail the labor and the credit markets and also, how the problem of multiple 
equilibrium arises in this environment. 
4.1 Labor Market 
The labor market at period t is comprised of managers (agents born at period 
t - 1) who demand labor, and workers (agents born at t and possibly at t - 1) 
who supply labor. Since the size of each generation is one, the total labor 
supply of the new generation is given by: 
(12) 
Given the signal O" at time t, sorne individuals will decide to become 
managers in the advanced sector paying the entry costo Those who did 
not pay the fixed cost at time t can either be workers or managers in the 
subsistence sector. The managers' labor demands in the advanced and the 
subsistence sectors are given by equations (13) and (14) respectively: 
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J: (1- </> (a, A (0"), Vt, Vt+1, rt,t+1)) ls (>, (0")) dH (a) = (1- A (0")) ls (A (0")) 
(14) 
The equilibrium wage in this market, v*, is given (if v* < va) by: 
A (O") la (A (0")) + (1- A (0")) ls (A (0")) = Ó (15) 
There could also be the case that the equilibrium wage, v*, is greater than 
vo. In that case, the agents who do not pay the entry cost become workers, 
and the equilibrium wage is given by: 
A (O") la (A (0")) = Ó + (1- A (0")) a (16) 
As we pointed out in Section 3, the equilibrium wage in the labor market 
will be a function of the measure of entrepreneurs in the advanced sector. 
Assuming that v (A) < va, we can use equations (5), (6) and (16) to solve for 
v (A), la (A) and ls (A). \Ve found that v (A) and la (A) are strictly increasing 
in A, and that ls (A) is increasing in A. A higher fraction of people using the 
advanced technology will imply an increment in the total labor demand, with 
the consequence of a higher level of wages. The next proposition formalizes 
this statement. 
Proposition 2 . Jf v (A) < vO VA, then: 
(i) v (A) is increasing in A, 
(ii) ls (A) is decreasing in A, and 
(iii) la (A) is increasing in A. 
Proof. [See Appendix) 
4.2 Credit Market 
Since this is an overlapping generations model, there can not be debt con-
tracts between different generations. AH credit transactions must be realized 
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among members of the same generation. So, at each period t, only the mem-
bers of generation t are engaged in financial transactions. AIso, notice that 
the interest rate is bounded below by the storage technology gross return, 
i.e. rt,t+1 2: 1, Vi. 
The total funds, at any point in time, are given by the total amount of 
resources in the economy, that is 8Vt. Agents who want to be managers in 
the advanced technology sector at t + 1 must pay cp at time t. They can 
do this using internal plus external funds. Therefore, the total demand for 
funds in this economy is given by: 
cp f: cp (a, A (O") ,Vt, Vt+1, rt,t+1) dH (a) = CPA (O") 
Then, the equilibrium interest rate is given by: 
(17) 
(18) 
In order to clarify equation (18), note that when we have borrowing con-
straints, the actual observed value of At+1 is given by: 
Equation (19) is a fixed point problem with, possibly, more than one 
solution. Notice that, when c/JAt+l < 8vt, that is, when the fraction of en-
trepreneurs is less than the fraction of projects that can be financed in the 
economy, the interest rate will be equal to one. We can rule out sorne solu-
tions of (19). In particular, we can rule out any A > AmaJo where Amax is the 
maximum measure of people that can be managers at any time: 
\ . (8~ ) Amax,t = mln -;¡;,1 (20) 
The total fraction of entrepreneurs is restricted by the resources in the 
economy, so it can not be greater than the funds available per project at any 
time, or the actual size of population. An equilibrium in which the resources 
are used in an efficient way, that is, to finance the maximum number of 
projects, can exist if and only if: 
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(21) 
If condition (21) is satisfied, there exists an excess of demand in the 
credit market. By continuity of ac (-) and H (.), we can find an interest 
rate, r (Amax , v), that will clear the rnarket. The equilibrium will be reached 
if, at r (Amax , v), the agents are indifferent between being a manager in the 
advanced and the subsistence technology; or because the tightening of the 
borrowing constraint will squeeze enough people out of the credit market, 
i.e. 
r (Amax , v) = min (rl (Amax , v) ,r2 (Amax , v)) 
where rl (Amax , v) and r2 (Amax , v) solve the following equations: 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
Note that condition (21) can be satisfied only for sorne wage values. Be-
fore analyzing this situation, let us define the equilibrium properly. 
5 Equilibrium 
A sunspot-correlated equilibrium is sequences of sunspots {at}, prices {rt,t+1' Vt}, 
payment functions { <Pt (a, At+1 (at) , Vt, Vt+ 1, rt,H 1)}, fractions of managers {At (at-l)}, 
and labor demands {lat (At (at-l)) ,lst (At (at-l))) such that: 
Optimality 
• Given at-l, At (at-d, Vt-l, Vt, and rt-l,t; lato (.) and lst (.) solve problems 
(5) and (6) respectively . 
• Given at-l, At (at-d, Vt-l, Vt, and rt-l,t; an individual type a chooses 
<P (-) to satisfy (8) and (9). 
Market Clearing 
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• Given Ut, At+l (Ut) and Vt; rt,t+land Vt+l clear the credit and the labor 
markets. 
Consistency 
6 Multiple Equilibrium in the Development 
Process 
In this section, we study the process of economic development. \Ve found 
that, in the early stages of development, there is only one equilibrium. The 
multiplicity of equilibria arises when the economy reaches a minimum level 
of wealth that allows a non-trivial fraction of people to obtain credit. Once 
the economy is at this stage, because of the existence of an externality in 
the productive sector, there will be more than one equilibrium. As we will 
prove in the next section, this problem does not arise if the credit market is 
perfect or if it does not existo The reason for such result is that, in those 
cases, the connection between the externality effect and the credit market is 
broken. The multiplicity of equilibria will remain until the economy reaches 
a new threshold leve!. At that point, sorne individuals will have access to the 
credit market even though the measure of entrepreneurs is zero. 
Before analyzing the development process, let us define the function 'Y (.) 
by: 
'Y (A, v, r) = 1 - H (ac (A, v, r)) (25) 
The next proposition characterizes this function 'Y (.). Note that the slope 
of this function with respect to A is always positive, but the magnitude of 
the slope will depend on the sign of the first derivative of h (a) with respect 
to a, ha (a), and the relative strength of the externality effect. 
Proposition 3 . The funciion 'Y (.) defined in (25) is: 
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(i) A continuous function of >., v and r, 
(ii) / (.) is increasing in A and v, 
(iii) / (.) is decreasing in r, and 
(iv) /A > O, and /AA > / < O. 
Proof. [See Appendix] 
In what follows, we will do our analysis under the following assumptions: 
Assumption 3.- h (a) is uniform: ha (a) = O for all a. 
Assumption 4.- There is a strong externality effect: fA > B, for sorne 
B and A close to zero. 
This is just for simplicity, the same results can be obtained if the in-
come distribution is characterized by a negative slope, i.e. ha (a) < O for 
all a. In that case, along with Assumption 4, we have that /)..).. < O. If we 
choose a more "realistic" income distribution, with ha (a) > O for a < Xo 
and ha (a) < O for a > Xo for sorne Xo E (0:, f3); the number of equilibria 
could increase and the multiplicity problem could be more persistent. The 
reason for this is that /)..A will be negative for A close to O, and positive for A 
close to 1. The only different case would be when Xo goes to {3, Le. /A).. > O 
for all A. In that case, it can be proved that the multiplicity of equilibria 
will arise much later. In fact, if the externality effect is not too strong, .the 
indeterminacy would appear, when in the case of the other economies, this 
problem has already disappeared. 
Next, we will analyze the equilibrium along the development process for 
an economy that satisfies Assumptions 3 and 4. To find an equilibrium, we 
need to find the fixed point of equation (19). We can find a set of wages 
close to zero such that, even though the fraction of entrepreneurs is equal to 
one, there is no agent who can have access to the credit market. No matter 
how big the externality is, we can always have wages close enough to zero 
such that the criticallevel of ability to get credit is greater than f3. In this 
situation, there exists a unique equilibrium in this economy. This equilibrium 
is given by A = O. 
For a higher wage, and given a strong externality effect, we can have 
a situation in which a positive fraction of entrepreneurs can overcome the 
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credit constraint just because the same fraction of people becomes managers 
in the advanced technology sector. This will be an equilibrium if an only if 
the resources of the economy are big enough to finance this measure of en-
trepreneurs. If this is not the case, the economy has still a unique equilibrium. 
As the economy grows, we found two positive me asures of entrepreneurs that 
could be considered as equilibria. We will show that, at sorne point, the 
resources in the economy will be big enough to finance the lowest of these 
fractions of managers. At that point, we have two equilibria. One given by 
the lowest of these positive measures. The other given by >. = o. Remember 
that even if the measure of entrepreneurs is zero, nobody can overcome the 
borrowing constraint. 
From this period, the number of equilibria will increase to three being the 
first two as the ones obtained before, and the third one given by the resources 
in the economy: At = 8;t. In this situation, such measure of entrepreneurs 
implies that a much bigger fraction of people can have access to the credit 
market. Since the resources in the economy are not big enough to finance all 
these projects, the interest rate must rise to clear this excess demando We will 
prove that, for all the relevant range of wages, the highest fixed point of this 
problem will be always aboye the economy's resources. This situation will 
persist until the economy reaches sorne level of wage in which, even though 
nobody is using the advanced technology, the richest agent in the economy 
will be able to get credit. From this moment, the bad equilibrium (>' = O) 
disappears. The unique equilibrium will be given by A = Amax • Theorem 4 
formalizes this statement. 
Theorem 4 . Jf Assumptions 3 and 4 are satisfied, there exists two wage 
levels, VI and V2, with VI > V2, such that: 
Then: 
(i) For any V < VI, there exists only one equilibrium. 
(ii) For some V E (VI, V2), there are multiple equilibria. 
(iii) Por any V > V2, there exists only one equilibrium. 
Proof. [See Appendix} 
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(26) 
In Figure 2, we show the evolution of the equilibria in the economy. For 
a given v, we can denote by Am (v) and AM (v) the lowest and the highest 
fixed points of equation (19), and by R(v) the total resources per project in 
the economy. We see that R(v) is always lower than AM (v), which implies 
that AM (v) will never be an equilibrium and that Am (v) is decreasing. See 
Appendix for a formal proof of those statements. 
[Figure 2 here] 
Note that if we had a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, 
the highest fixed point, AM (v), would be attainable. The implication of this 
is that an open economy will be expected to grow faster than a closed econ-
omy. Moreover, we should observe a higher variability for open economies 
than for closed ones. 
Obviously, the variability in the economy during the multiple equilib-
rium stage will be higher than the variability in other stages. The degree of 
variability will depend on the sunspot probabilistic distribution. Since the 
equilibrium value of A is perfectIy correlated with the sunspot, which is a 
random variable, then A is a random variable itself. In that sense, in this 
economy we can use the variance of A as a proxy for variability. The be-
havior of the variance of A is such that, when the multiplicity appears, the 
variance jumps from zero to a positive value. Then, the variance will be, 
first, decreasing with respect to v, starting to rise as the size of the economy 
increases. When the multiplicity disappears, the variance will be zero again. 
The reason for this behavior is that if two equilibria are close and one of 
them starts moving toward a third one, the variability decreases until they 
become too close. This is formalized in the next proposition. 
Proposition 5. In the multiple equilibrium stage, the variability of the 
output, jirst decreases, and then increases. 
Proof. (See Appendix] 
In order to prove Proposition (5), we use a time-invariant probability 
distribution in which each sunspot has the same probability each periodo The 
results are the same if we use symmetric first-order Markov probabilities in 
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which the probability of observing a given sunspot this period will depend 
on the sunspot observed last period6 • The results are not robust to all non-
symmetric Markov probabilities or other time-depending probabilities. 
7 Wages, Interest Rate and Entrepreneurship 
In this section, we will study the equilibrium values of wages, interest rates, 
and measure of entrepreneurs during the development process. We will prove 
that, if an economy satisfies sorne conditions for growth, then, for any initial 
condition VD, the econorny will converge to the long run equilibrium with 
positive probability. The condition for growth implies that there exists a 
required minimum level of productivity in the subsistence technology, and 
that the set of sunspots that irnplies the "good" equilibriurn with probability 
zero has rneasure zero. 
The conditions for growth are the following: 
g¡ (8) > w' and m (A) = O 
where m (A) is the rneasure of a set A, and A = {(jt : Pr [A ((jt) = R (Vt)] = O}. 
The first part guarantees that the econorny will reach the multiple equilib-
rium stage. The second implies that the econorny willleave that stage. 
If the conditions for growth are satisfied, the economy will reach the mul-
tiple equilibrium stage and, with positive probability, will be at the highest 
equilibrium. 'Ve can construct a sequence of At from t equal one to t equal T, 
in which At takes the highest value. This sequence has a positive probability 
if T < oo. Sínce At is increasing at sorne finite time, the economy willleave 
this stage and will converge to the long run equilibrium: A* = 1, r* = 1 and 
v* = II (8, A*). This fact is proved in the next theorem. 
Theorem 6 . JI the condition lor growth is satisfied, lor any initial VD, the 
economy will converge to the long ron equilibrium with positive probability. 
Proof. [See Appendix] 
6By symmetric we mean that, the probability of today's sunspot j given yesterday's 
sunspot i is equal to the probability of today's sunspot i given yesterday's sunspot j. 
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8 Credit Market and Variability 
The pourpouse of this section is to analyze how many difIerent degrees of 
imperfection in the credit market will afIect the equilibrium of the economy. 
In Section 6, we have already seen that, when there exists imperfections in 
the credit market (Le. O < (J < 1), we could have multiple equilibria. Now, 
we show that when the credit market is perfect, Le. () = 1, or when the credit 
market does not exist, Le. () = O, the equilibrium will be unique. The reason 
for this is that, when there is no credit market, there is no interaction between 
the externality in the productive sector and the borrowing constraint. Only 
the fraction of people with wealth greater than the entry cost will become 
entrepreneurs. Also, when the credit market is perfect, there are no longer 
borrowing constraints and, therefore, all the resources are used to finance the 
payment of the entry cost of those who want to use the advanced technology. 
The interest rate will be such that the agents are indifIerent between using 
the advanced or the subsistence technology. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 will study 
both cases. 
8.1 Perfect-Credit Market Economy 
Suppose that Vo < ~. This condition means that the initial resources are not 
enough to finance all the people in this economy. The people who become 
managers in the advanced technology sector are given by AO = ~. Since, by 
assumption, it is profitable to be a manager when the interest rate is one, 
everybody will demand credit for investment. In order for the credit market 
to clear, the interest rate will have to rise. 
Once we have AO, the wage rate for the next period, VI, can be uniquely 
determined using VI = V (A) (see Section 4). Notice that, even though we 
have an externality in the productive sector, each time the measure of en-
trepreneurs is only determined by the resource constraints in the economy. 
The next proposition formalizes this statement. 
Proposition 7. Given some endowment avo for the initial old su eh that 
Vo < ~, if the eredit market is perfect, then: 
(i) At eaeh t, there is only one equilibrium, i.e. Vt, AH!' and rt,t+1 are 
uniquely determined. 
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(ii) The equilibrium sequences {Vt} and {At} are non decreasing and con-
verge to the long run equilibrium. 
Proaf. [See Appendix] 
It is worthwhile to notice the behavior of the interest rate. When A < 1, 
rt,HI (A) is increasing in A. The reason for this is that, as the total fraction 
of managers increases in this economy, the managerial profits also increase 
(due to the externality). As a result, the interest rate needed to clear this 
market up is higher. However, as soon as A reaches the value of one, the 
financial resources are abundant relative to the population resources (the 
fraction of managers can not be greater than one) and the interest rate will 
drop abruptIy to one (the storage technology return). Notice that we can 
observe the same situation when there exists multiple equilibrium. In that 
case, the drastic change in interest rate will be accompanied by a drastic 
change in A. However, when the credit market is perfect, a drastic change in 
interest rate will be caused by a change of regime. The economy moves from 
a resources constrained to a resources unconstrained economy. In that case, 
a large movement in the interest rate is accompanied by a small change in A. 
8.2 Non Credit Market Economy 
Suppose now that the initial condition over Vo is such that f3 Vo < cjJ, which 
implies that nobody will become entrepreneur at period one. The wage rate 
at that period will be given by VI = gz (8). In this case, the condition for 
growth is that VI > ~, otherwise the advanced technology will never be used. 
Noticed that, when there is no credit market or when the credit market is 
incomplete, there are sorne conditions on the productivity of the subsistence 
sector to guarantee that the economy will take off. This is not the case when 
the credit market is perfect. 
Since the people can not borrow resources, the entry cost must be self-
financed. Then, given Vt, only a fraction of people equal to 1 - H (t) is 
going to become managers the next periodo Once At-I is known, the wage 
rate Vt+l can be easily determined (see Section 4). Then, the sequences of 
wages {Vt} and measures of managers {At} are uniquely determined, and they 
will converge to the long-run equilibrium. The next proposition formalizes 
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this statement. 
Proposition 8 . Given so me endowment avo for the initial old such that 
Vo < ~, if the credit market do es not exist and gl (8) > ~, then: 
(i) At each period t, there is only one equilibrium, i.e. Vt and At+! are 
uniquely determined. 
(ii) The equilibrium sequences {vd and {Ad are non decreasing and con-
verge to the long ron equilibrium. 
Proof. [See Appendix} 
9 Conclusion 
This paper explains the GDP variability pattern of an economy during the 
development process. It is found that, at the middle stages of development, 
the economy experiences high levels of GDP variability. On the other hand, 
in earIy and mature stages of development, we observe a much lower variabil-
ity in per capita GDP. This variability is explained because, in an imperfect 
credit market environment, the number of equilibria will depend on the size 
of the economy. In particular, when the economy is very poor, there is only 
one possible equilibrium. After the economy reaches sorne threshold level, 
there can be multiple equilibria. This multiplicity disappears when the econ-
omy is fully developed. The existence of multiple equilibria is due to the fact 
that the externality in the productive sector will be reflected in the financial 
one. A larger fraction of people using the advanced technology will imply a 
larger fraction of people with access to the credit market. 
The relationship between the degree of development of the financial sec-
tor and the variability in the economy is also analyzed. It is found that, 
in the case of either economies with perfect credit markets or economies in 
which the credit markets are non-existent, the equilibrium is unique. How-
ever, when the credit market exists but is imperfect, there could be more 
than one equilibrium. In the latter case, the multiplicity arises in the middle 
stages of development. This is due to the fact that when there is no credit 
market, there is no interaction between the externality in the productive sec-
tor and the borrowing constraint. Only the fraction of people with wealth 
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greater than the entry cost will become entrepreneurs. Also, when the credit 
market is perfect, there are no borrowing constraints, and all the resources 
are used to finance the payment of the entry cost for those who want to use 
the advanced technology. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1: First of aH, we need to prove that ITa (.-\) is a 
continuous function of .-\. 
Claim: ITa (.-\) is a continuous and increasing function of .-\. 
Proof. In order to prove this claim, we need to use a result that will be 
proved later (Proposition 2): v (.-\) is a continuous and increasing function of 
A. Given that f (l,.-\) - v (A) l is bounded from aboye, continuous in l and 
A, and with compact range, we can apply the Theorem of the Maximum to 
show that ITa (.-\) is a continuous function. To see that it is increasing in A, 
just take derivatives with respect to .-\ and applying the Envelop Theorem 
we get: 
aIT (A) = f _ av (A) l ( (.-\) A) 
aA ,\ a.-\ v , (27) 
This is positive if the average labor productivity is greater than the 
marginal labor productivity, which is the present case (see Proposition 2) .• 
(i) By our c1aim, it is easy to see that ac (.) is continuous in A, r, and v. 
(ii) Moreover, we can take partial derivatives with respect to r, and we 
get: 
aac (-) = BITa (A) 2 > O 
art,t+! Vt (rt,t+¡) 
(28) 
(iii) Now, taking derivatives with respect to .-\ and V, respectively: 
aac (-) = -ac (-) < O 
aVt Vt r t,t+l 
(29) 
(30) 
• 
Proof of Proposition 2: Given that all the conditions are satisfied for 
the Theorem of the Maximum, we can apply it to equations (5) and (6). 
After maximizing, we get the following equations: 
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JI (la (v, A) , A) = V (31) 
9¡ (ls (v)) = v (32) 
Now, using the equilibrium market condition (15), we have a system of 
three equations with three unknowns: la (A, 8), ls (A, 8) and V (A, 8). This 
can be reduced to a system of two equations (solving for ls (A, 8)). Taking 
derivatives with respect to A, we get: 
( 
O 
1 + 9/1 A 
¡u(l-A) 
Solving (36), we have: 
~ ) ( DI ) = ( - JIA ) 
(l-A) a>.. O 
( Bt ) = ~ ( -r{~fl)>" ) > ( O ) 7ff IAI JIA (1 + ful~~>..)) O 
(33) 
(34) 
Where IAI = - (fu + (f~~)) > O. This proves (i) and (iii). In order to prove 
(ii), just note that from equation (15): 
Ols (-) - (1- A) Ola (-) 
-8A A 8A (35) 
• 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
(i) The continuity of 'Y (-) follows from the continuity of H (.) and the 
continuity of ac O. 
(ii) Since ac (-) is decreasing in A and v, and H ( .) is increasing in a, this 
proves that 'Y ( .) is increasing in A and v. 
(iii) To prove that 'Y (.) is decreasing in r, just note that ac (-) is increasing 
in r and H (.) is increasing in a. 
(iv) Taking derivatives with respect to 'Y (. ): 
81'(·) = -h( (\ )) 8ac (A,v,r) O 8A ac A, v, r 8A > (36) 
Equation (39) is positive because of Proposition 1 part (iii). 
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02,(.) = -h ((' )) Oac(A,V,r) h( (' )) (Oac(A,V,r))2 (37) OA2 a ac 1\, v, r {)A ac 1\, v, r {)A 
The second term is always negative and the first term could be positive (if 
ha (a) > O), negative (if ha (a) < O), or zero (if ha (a) = O). The overall result 
will be unknown. If the externality effect is almost null, and ha (a) > O, then 
(40) can be positive. But if the externality effect is strong, the second term 
will domínate the first one and (40) will be negative .• 
Proof of Theorem 4: 
(i) For any v < v!, we have that ac (1, v, 1) > (3. Then, (A, v, 1) = O for 
any A. The only equilibrium is A = o. 
(ii) Because of (26) and the continuity of ac (0), we can define a function 
AZ (v) for v E (VI, V2) such that: 
(38) 
Notice that AZ (-) is decreasing in v, ,>.. (-) = O for A :::; AZ (v) and ,>.. (-) > O 
for A > AZ (v). Notice also that, for A E (A Z (v) ,(3), ,>..>.. < O. Since h (.) and 
a~cL) are continuous functions, we can have v' and X such that: 
A' =, (X, v', 1) and,>.. (X, v', 1) = 1 (39) 
Assuming that ac (1, V2, 1) > a (we can pick a close enough to zero), we 
can define two functions: Am: [V' ,V2] -+ [O,X] and AM : [V' ,V2] -+ [X,A"], 
such that: 
(40) 
Claim: The functions in equation (43) exist and are well defined. 
Proof. Note that for any v E (v', V2): AZ (v) > , (AZ (v), v, 1); , (X, v, 1) > 
X and, (1, v, 1) < 1. Then, due to the continuity of" for each v, there exist 
two functions Am and AM, such that they are the fixed points of equation 
(43). Moreover, Am (v) E (AZ (v), X), and A1I1 E (X, 1) .• 
Claim: Am (v) is a decreasing function and AM (v) is an increasing func-
tion. 
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Proof. For Am (v), suppose noto Take Wl < W2. Then, for any A E 
(Am(V) ,X), I'(A,Wl, l) > A. But, I'(Am(w2),w2,1) > I'(Am(w2),wI,1) > 
Am (W2). A contradiction. 
For AM (v), suppose noto Take Wl < W2. Then, for any A E (X,AM (v)), 
l' (\ Wl, 1) > A. But, l' (AM (W2) , W2, 1) > l' (AM (W2) , Wl, 1) > AM (W2). A 
contradiction. • 
Those fixed points will be equilibria if and only if Aj (v) < R (v), where 
we can define R ( v) as: 
R (v) = 8v 
cp ( 41) 
Assume that v' is such that X > 6;'. Then, at v', the only equilibrium is 
given by A = o. Since Am (v) is decreasing, R (v) is increasing and R (V2) > 
Am (V2) = O. Then, there exists a level of wage w
' 
such that R (w' ) = Am (w' ). 
At w', there are two equilibria: A = O and A = R (w' ) = Am (w' ). 
For any v E (w' , V2) there are three equilibria: A = O, A = Am (w /), and 
A = min {R (v) , AM (v)}. The first two equilibria are obvious. We need to 
show that the third equilibrium exists. Then, we will show that for any 
v::; V2, R(v) < AM (v). First, suppose that R(v) < AM (v). Then, AM (v) is 
not an equilibrium. Since l' (R (v) ,v, 1) > R (v), there exists r = ro (R (v)) 
such that l' (R (v), v, ro (R (v))) = R (v). The continuity of l' (-) guarantees 
the existence of such interest rateo See Section 4 for a proper definition of 
ro (R(v)). Now, suppose that AM(V) < R(v). Then, by definition, \\1 (v) 
is an equilibrium. Since l' (R (v), v, 1) < R (v), then R (v) can not be an 
equilibrium. Note that, at v = V2, Am (V2) = O. That means that at v = V2, 
there are only two equilibria. 
It is easy to see that, in fact, R (v) < AM (v) for all v < V2. First, define 
v" as: ac (1, v", 1) = Ct. It is trivial to show that v" > V2. Then, we can 
extend the domain of the function AM (v) from [v', V2] to [v', v"]. Obviously, 
AM (v") = 1 and R (v") < 1. Now, since AM (v) and R (v) are both increasing 
and (weakly) concave functions, then: 
R (v) < AA¡(V) for all v E (v', v") (42) 
(iii) First, note that for any v > V2, l' (O, v, 1) > O. The bad equilib-
rium vanishes from the economy. Now, since we have proved in (ii) that 
R (v) < AM (v), then the only equilibrium in this stage will be given by: 
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At = ~ and rt,t+! = ro (~ ). Note that when v = ~, At = 1 and rt,t+! = 1, 
for all t. • .. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Let liS denote by IIg and IIb, the probabilities 
of choosing the good and the bad equilibrium, respectively, with IIg + IIb < 1. 
Then, the variance ofthe equilibriurn value, for a given v E (W',V2), is given 
by the next equation: 
\Vhen v is close to w', taking derivatives and assurning, for sirnplicity, 
that IIg = 1 - IIg - IIb, we have that: 
8V (A (v)) '" 2II (1 _ II _ II 8W') (~+ 8Am (V)) < O (44) 
8v <p <p 8v 
This is true sin ce it can be showed that OA8':V) -t -00 as v -t w'. Now, if v 
is close to V2, and noting that OA8'v(V) -t O as v -t V2, we have that: 
8V (A (v)) '" 2II (1 _ II) ~ > O 
8v <p (45) 
• 
Proof of Theorem 6: Assurne, without 10ss of generality, that Vo < w'. 
Then Al = O. Since gl (8) > w', then with positive probability A2 = ~ > 
Al = O. By induction, we can construct increasing sequences for At and Vt, 
with positive probability. Since ls (A) is decreasing in A, 91 (ls) is decreasing 
in ls, and gl (e) -t 00 as e -t O, at sorne point T, given An VT 2: ~. If such 
AT exists with positive probability, then AT+! = 1 with the sarne probability. 
Once the econorny reaches this stage, for all t 2: T + 1, AT = 1 = A * and 
Vt = JI (8, 1) = v*. At this point, rt,t+! = 1. 
The behavior of the interest rate is as follows. If At+! = R (Vt), then 
rt,t+1 = ro (R (Vt)). If At+! < R (Vt), then rt,H1 = 1. If R (Vt) > 1, then 
AH1 = 1 and rt,t+1 = 1. • 
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Proof of Proposition 7: 
(i) Just note that the equilibrium will be given by: At+1 = max {~ }; 
rt,t+1 = rl (~ ) if ~ < 1 and rt,t+l = 1 if ~ ~ 1; and Vt+ l = JI (la (~ ) , ~ ). 
All the variabíes depend on just Vt. 
(ii) Assurne, without 10ss of generality, that Vo = o. Then, since VI > VO, 
we have A2 > Al. We can continue this reasoning by induction. If Vt-l < 
Vt < ~, then At < At+1. Since 1 s (A) is decreasing in A, 91 (l s (A)) is decreasing 
in ls, and 91 (é) - 00 as é - O, at sorne point TVt ~ ~. Then, At+1 = 1 
and Vt+1 = JI (8,1). Then, for any t ~ T + 1, At = A* and Vt = v*. Notice 
that rt,t+l = rl (~) is strictly increasing when Vt < ~. To prove this, just 
note that aIl;?,) > O and aIl;?) < O. \Vhen Vt > ~, rt,t+1 = 1. This drastic 
change in the interest rate is associated to a change in the regirne: frorn a 
constrained to an unconstrained econorny .• 
Proof of Proposition 8: 
(i) Since, by assurnption, J (l, O) - <P > 9 (l) for alll; aH the agents with 
wealth greater than <p (i.e. with ability greater than !É.) will pay the entry 
Vt 
cost at t and becorne entrepreneurs at t + 1. Then: 
(46) 
Given At+l, then Vt+1 = V (At+l), where V (A) is the function defined in Propo-
sition 2. 
(ii) Note that, in equation (52), At+l is an increasing function of Vt. Also, 
v (A) is an increasing function of A. Given the condition for growth in this 
econorny, VI = 91 (8) > ~. Then, A2 = 1 - H (9!W) > Al = O. FoHowing by 
induction, we can establish increasing sequences for At and Vt when Vt < ~. 
Since ls (A) is decreasing and 91 (é) - 00 as é - O, there exists sorne finite T 
at which Vt ~ ~. Frorn then on, At = 1 = A*, for aH t, and Vt = JI (8,1) = v*, 
for aH t .• 
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